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IV 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over Appellant's/Respondent's appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (2006) and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR 
REVIEW BY APPELLANT 
1. Whether the trial court incorrectly divided the marital estate without first 
accounting for, and excluding from the marital estate, the parties' pre-marital and separate 
property. Because this is a question of law, the standard of review is for correctness. 
Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
2. Whether the trial court incorrectly divided the marital estate by failing to 
allocate and divide the marital estate on a fifty-fifty basis as required by law. The 
standard of review for questions of law is for correctness. Id. 
3. Whether the trial court made factual errors in its calculations to determine 
what assets and liabilities each party brought into the marriage and the value of the assets 
awarded to each party after the divorce. The trial court's factual findings are reviewed 
under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. 
The standard of appellate review for questions of law is for correctness and a trial 
court is afforded no special deference on review. Smith, 793 P.2d at 409. In contrast, the 
standard of review for factual findings is clearly erroneous. Id. More specifically, the 
standard of review for the division of marital property in divorce, because it is an 
equitable proceeding, is "clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion." Howell v. Howell, 
806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 
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373, f 12, 993 P.2d 887 ("we acknowledge that trial courts have considerable discretion in 
determining alimony and property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld unless 
a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Id. (internal citations 
omitted)). "This court will approve changes in a trial court's property and debt 
distribution only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, 
or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." 
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotations 
omitted); see also Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P. 2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The 
issues raised in this appeal were preserved in Appellant's Amended Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted on June 9, 2006, (R. 309-28) and in his 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Memorandum Decision, submitted June 
29,2006. (R. 406-13). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of The Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
This case involves the entry of a Decree of Divorce in which Appellant, Michael 
Hodge ("Husband"), appeals the trial court's final award and division of the marital 
estate. Appellee, Diane Hodge ("Wife"), filed for a divorce on September 2, 2005 on the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences. (R. 1-4). Husband filed an Answer on November 8, 
2005 (R. 20-22). Following a two day bench, before the honorable Bruce C. Lubeck on 
June 8 and 9, 2006, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on all issues except 
the issue of parent time which was scheduled for a subsequent trial in August, 2006. (R. 
353-75). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce were entered 
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by the trial court on July 31, 2006. (R. 437-70). See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, attached hereto as Addendum A. Prior to the final entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
Husband, filed a Motion to Amend Memorandum Decision on June 29, 2006, which was 
summarily denied on August 1, 2006. Subsequently, Husband, represented by new 
counsel, filed a timely Notice of Appeal on August 29, 2006. (R. 486-87) 
B. Statement of Facts Relating to the Division of Marital Property. 
First, because this appeal involves numerous accounts and asset values, a 
comprehensive reference table outlining the complete marital estate asset schedule is 
included herein and attached hereto as Addendum B. 
On August 8, 1998, the parties were married and separated in or about November 
2004, with a formal petition for divorce being filed on September 2, 2005. (R. 438). No 
children were born as issue of this marriage, however, Wife had two children from a 
previous marriage. (R. 440). At the time of the marriage, Wife was initially employed as 
a school teacher, then as a part-time sales representative, and since 2003 as a real estate 
agent. (R. 443). Husband has been continuously employed as a Delta Airlines pilot. (R. 
440). 
Wife's income has ranged from $21,000, at the time the parties first met, to 
$680,000 in 2005 when Wife worked in the Park City, Utah real estate market. (R. 396). 
Husband's income has ranged from $198,000 in 2004 to approximately $151,000 in 2005, 
and approximately $130,000 in 2006. (R. 312). Husband's overall income reduction is a 
result of involuntary pay cuts at Delta Airlines even though he was promoted to the 767 
captain position. 
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Each party entered the marriage owning separate homes and at different times 
during the course of the marriage these pre-marital assets were sold with the net proceeds 
being used to either fund the purchase of another marital residence (first the Monitor 
Drive home in Park City, Utah, and eventually the American Saddler Drive home also in 
Park City, Utah) or used to fund a jointly held Ameritrade investment account (#8730). 
(R. 449; 453; 454; 458). The pre-marital homes included Husband's Jeremy Ranch home 
with an equity interest he received of $255,000 (R. 458); and Wife's Lucky John home, 
with an equity interest she received of $443,000. (R. 449). 
Prior to the marriage, and undisputed by the parties, Husband had a Delta 
Retirement Account which included his Delta Family Care Savings Plan valued at 
approximately $89,000.' (R. 389; 319). Additionally, Wife is the beneficiary of a 
personal trust which had cash assets of approximately $47,000 at the time of the marriage. 
(R. 383). Her trust was also the entity in which title to her pre-marital home (Lucky John, 
Park City, Utah) was held. (R. 453). The Lucky John home eventually sold during the 
course of the marriage and the proceeds from this sale were transferred into the parties' 
joint Ameritrade investment account (#8730). (R. 449). 
i.) The pre-marital and marital homes. 
Although the parties purchased two different homes during the course of the 
marriage, at the time of trial, the parties owned only one residence, i.e., the marital 
1
 Husband's Delta Retirement Account includes four separate sub-accounts: 1) 
Delta Airlines Inc., also referred to as the "Family Care Savings Plan"; 2) Delta Defined 
Contribution Retirement; 3) Delta Traditional IRA; and 4) Delta MPPP. The total value 
of the Delta Retirement Account, at the time of trial, was $375,535. SeeExh. 134. The 
parties agree that $89,277 from the Delta Family Care Savings Plan was a pre-marital 
asset. 
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residence located at 2964 American Saddler Drive, Park City, Utah, which the parties still 
own. (R. 454). At the time of trial, the parties stipulated to a current fair market value of 
the marital residence of $1,350,000 less the debt encumbering the home of $567,000 
which resulted in a net equity of $783,000. (R. 394; 317; 556; TT: 541, lines 5-7). Prior 
to purchasing the marital residence, in August 1998, the parties purchased their first home 
together on Monitor Drive, Park City, Utah, for $975,180. (R. 454). In order to recast the 
loan on the Monitor Drive home (after the actual closing on this home and after 
Husband's Jeremy Ranch home also closed), Husband invested the net proceeds from the 
sale of his Jeremy Ranch home, in the amount of $255,000, into the Monitor Drive home. 
(R. 454; 458). In addition, both parties invested $20,000 of pre-marital monies into this 
home, and Husband subsequently invested an additional $30,000 of his pre-marital funds 
as well. (R. 454). All told, Husband invested $305,000 of separate pre-marital funds into 
the Monitor Drive residence. In addition, the parties borrowed money from Wife's 
sister's trust ("Suzie's Trust") in a total amount of $254,000. (R. 454). 
Eventually, the parties sold the Monitor Drive home and purchased the marital 
residence on American Saddler Drive. (R. 454). At the same time, the parties used 
$200,000 from the sale of the Monitor Drive home to re-pay Suzie's Trust. (R. 454). A 
remaining debt of $54,000 to that trust from that particular loan still exists. (R. 385). 
Wife's pre-marital home on Lucky John, Park City, Utah was appraised in 1998 
for $740,000. (R.453). Wife lived in this home, prior to the marriage, with her two 
children and her permanently disabled sister, Suzie. Wife is the sole trustee of Suzie's 
Trust and Wife is responsible for her sister's care until either of their deaths. (R. 384). 
Prior to the marriage, Wife decided to move Suzie into her Lucky John home, borrowing 
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$ 184,000 from Suzie's Trust to pay off the mortgage on that house. (R. 384; 449). In the 
summer of 2000, after the parties were married, Wife sold the Lucky John home and 
received net proceeds of $627,000. (R. 449). However, $184,000 of the $627,000 
represents an outstanding pre-marital debt to Suzie's Trust, leaving a remaining pre-
marital equity interest of $443,000 attributable to Wife. (R. 449). Wife did not repay 
this pre-marital debt, however, at that time. Instead, the parties used $610,000 from these 
proceeds to open a joint Ameritrade account (#8730) in 2000, which assets were 
eventually lost in the stock market. (R. 449; 450). 
Jeremy Ranch (Mike's pre-marital home) $255,000 (equity/co-mingled) 
Lucky John (Diane's pre-marital home) $443,000 (equity/co-mingled) 
American Saddler (marital residence) $783,000 (current equity interest) 
In addition, to the pre-marital and marital residences at issue in this case, the 
parties had numerous other accounts including individual retirement accounts, checking 
accounts, and savings accounts. While the parties do not dispute that certain accounts are 
pre-marital, there are several accounts solely in one or the other party's name which, 
however, were established and/or funded during the course of the marriage with marital 
assets. (R. 459; 461-62). The division of these accounts are also disputed. 
ii.) Loans from Suzie's Trust. 
During the course of the marriage the parties incurred significant debt, in large 
part, because of the various loans from Suzie's Trust. As discussed in the preceding 
section, prior to the marriage Wife borrowed $184,000 from Suzie's Trust to help pay off 
the mortgage on her Lucky John home. (R. 449). This loan was subsequently re-paid by 
Wife in December 2005. (R. 555; TT: 131). The parties took a second loan from Suzie^s 
Trust in the amount of $254,000, at the time they purchased the Monitor Drive home in 
1998. (R. 454). The parties have repaid $200,000 of this loan, thus leaving a remaining 
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debt for this loan of $54,000. (R. 454). Lastly, the parties borrowed an additional 
$100,000 from Suzie's Trust in or around May 2001 which was invested in the joint 
Ameritrade account, and was subsequently lost in the stock market. (R. 451). This 
amount has not been repaid, leaving a total amount still owing to Suzie's Trust of 
$154,000. (R. 388). 
Loan #1 $ 184,000 (pre-marital/co-mingled) 
Loan #2 $254,000 (marital) 
Loan #3 $100,000 (marital) 
Total: $538,000 
Payment #1 $200,000 (marital) 
Payment #2 $184,000 (marital) 
Total: $384,000 
Debt Owing $154,000 (marital) 
Hi.) Stock market investments. 
The parties opened the joint Ameritrade account (#8730) in 2000 using $610,000 
of the sale proceeds from Wife's home. (R. 449-50). This initial investment sum 
included the outstanding loan of $184,000. Unfortunately, the stock market took a 
dramatic downward turn and the parties lost their entire investment. (R. 449-50). 
Subsequently, in May of 2001, the parties borrowed an additional $100,000 from Suzie's 
Trust and this too was eventually lost in the stock market. (R. 451). The trial court heard 
extensive testimony about each parties involvement with the Ameritrade account and their 
trading activities, and concluded that while Husband shouldered more responsibility for 
the parties' losses, the Ameritrade funds represented co-mingled funds and the loss was 
marital and attributable to both parties. (R. 449-53). The trial court was not persuaded 
that Wife was unaware of Husband's trading activities, therefore the trial court held her 
accountable for the marital loss as well. (R. 449-53). 
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iv.) Other relevant property findings. 
The trial court further found that the parties' pre-marital funds were largely co-
mingled as evidenced by the fact that the parties used these monies to purchase the 
marital residence, as well as the Monitor Drive home, and co-mingled funds when they 
opened their joint Ameritrade investment account. (R. 452; 453; 456; 458; 459). 
Regardless of this co-mingling, the trial court found the case was not appropriate for 
equalization of assets nor was each party entitled to be restored to his/her pre-marital 
position. (R. 457). The trial court's ruling is inconsistent in this regard because it states 
that the parties should not be restored to their pre-marital positions (R. 457) while also 
stating "the court's basic intent is for the parties to leave the marriage in the same relative 
position economically as when they entered the marriage . . . ." (R. 457). 
In conclusion, the trial court awarded Wife the marital residence along with her 
other personal and business accounts largely accrued during the marriage. (R. 459; 461). 
Husband was awarded his Delta Retirement Account, along with his personal checking 
account, the remaining balance of the joint Ameritrade account, and various other 
accounts held solely in his name. (R. 459; 461; 462). After the division of the marital 
estate, the trial court also ordered an equitable adjustment whereby Wife was ordered to 
pay Husband $100,000. The trial court found this to be equitable and an offset for 
Husband's contributions to the family during the course of the marriage and for the 
instability in the value of his Delta Retirement Account based on recent events with the 
Delta Airlines bankruptcy matter.2 (R. 460-61). 
2
 This issue was raised at trial by Husband's attorney and, in fact, on September 1, 
2006 the Delta Airlines Pilots Defined Benefit Retirement Plan was terminated due to the 
Delta Airlines bankruptcy. The Pension Guarantee Trust Corporation has taken over the 
Defined Benefit Retirement Plan and will pay the Delta Pilots approximately 15% of their 
accrued benefits. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to account for and 
segregate the parties' pre-marital and/or separate property which was not co-mingled 
during the course of the marriage, before it divided the marital estate. In addition, the 
trial court committed reversible error by failing to divide the estate on a fifty-fifty basis. 
Finally, it was reversible error for the trial court to base its findings on evidence which 
contradicted the evidence admitted at trial either by way of stipulation, individual 
exhibits, and/or testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE IT DID 
NOT ACCOUNT FOR, NOR DID IT SEGREGATE, THE PARTIES' PRE-
MARITAL/SEPARATE PROPERTY BEFORE IT DIVIDED THE 
MARITAL ESTATE. 
The unquestionable and fast-standing rule in divorce proceedings is that each party 
is presumed to be entitled to and shall retain their pre-marital and/or separate property 
that he or she brought into the marriage unless it has been co-mingled so that it has lost its 
separate character. See Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In this 
case, while the majority of pre-marital funds, mostly from the equity each party received 
from the sale of their respective pre-marital homes, were co-mingled, certain assets 
retained their separate character throughout the marriage. Therefore, as a matter of law, 
these assets should have been allocated to each of the parties prior to any division of the 
marital estate. By failing to follow this presumptive rule of law, the trial court committed 
reversible error. In addition, because this error raises an issue of law the standard of 
appellate review is for correctness and the trial court shall not be "accorded [] special 
deference on review." Smith, 793 P.2d at 409. 
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While the trial court entered a finding that "each of the parties brought pre-marital 
assets into the marriage" (R. 460) it failed to make specific and complete findings as to 
what these assets were and their values. Moreover, and significantly, the trial court failed 
to account for the fact that most of these pre-marital assets were co-mingled; it also failed 
to identify and value the parties' separate property (not necessarily pre-marital) which 
retained its separate character throughout the marriage; and finally the trial court failed to 
award the pre-marital and/or separate property to each party before identifying and 
valuing the actual marital estate. 
A, Husband should have been awarded his pre-marital and/or separate property 
which was not co-mingled. 
It was undisputed at trial that Husband entered the marriage with $89,277 in his 
Delta Family Care Savings Plan. (R. 389; 319). In addition, at the time of trial, Husband 
maintained a separate Ameritrade account (#1101) with a balance of $5,910 which 
represents the remaining value of his pre-marital IBM stock.3 (R. 319; 390). This 
account is his pre-marital and separate property (R. 319) because it did not lose its 
separate character during the marriage. See Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, f20, 
147 P.3d 464. At the time of trial, Husband also had a Zions Bank savings account with 
$1,028 which represents, in part, the remaining funds from two $10,000 gifts he received 
from his father, post-separation, and which were not co-mingled during the marriage. (R. 
390; 322). Although not pre-marital, the two $10,000 gifts constitute his separate 
property. In addition, the testimony at trial evidences that Husband had two RJ O'Brien 
3
 It should be noted that there are two Ameritrade accounts at issue in this case. 
Husband has maintained a separate Ameritrade account, #1101. The parties also 
maintained a joint Ameritrade account, #8730, which was funded by the equity from the 
Lucky John home. This latter account is the one in which significant sums of money 
were lost during the course of the marriage. 
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accounts; one with a balance at trial of $52,000 from money earned prior to the marriage, 
and the other with a balance of $18,000, the remaining funds from the $20,000 gift 
referenced above. (R. 390; 319). Husband does not claim any separate interest in the 
$255,000 of equity he received from the sale of his Jeremy Ranch home because these 
funds lost their separate character when they were co-mingled into the Monitor Drive 
home. In sum, the trial court should have awarded Husband his pre-marital and/or 
separate property which was not co-mingled in the amount of $166,215 prior to valuing 
and dividing the marital estate. See Addendum B. 
B. Wife should have been awarded her pre-marital and/or separate property 
which was not co-mingled. 
Wife also had pre-marital property, which was not co-mingled, that should have 
been awarded directly to her before dividing the marital estate. The testimony at trial 
demonstrated that Wife had approximately $47,000 in her personal trust at the time of 
marriage. (R. 383). However, the trial court's finding estimated the pre-marital value of 
the trust to be approximately $60,000. (R. 458). There is no evidence to support this 
finding and Wife's own Amended Proposed Findings of Fact indicate otherwise. (R. 
383). Arguably, hundreds of thousands of dollars moved in and out of this trust during 
the marriage, but at the time of trial, Wife's personal trust had an account balance of 
$47,831 and the parties agreed that Wife should be awarded this amount as her separate 
property. (R. 320). See Addendum B. 
In addition, it is undisputed by the parties that Wife maintained a pre-marital 
Schwab Rollover IRA account with a balance of $63,317 (R. 320) which should also have 
been awarded to Wife as her pre-marital and separate property. The remaining accounts 
held in Wife's name, or that of her business Creating Communities, were earned during 
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the course of the marriage, and in part since separation (R. 459-61) but should not be 
considered separate property. See Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah App. 
1990) (citing Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988)). As such, those 
amounts should not be awarded separately to Wife and should be included in the marital 
estate. Id. Consequently, Wife should have only been awarded as pre-marital and/or 
separate property, a total of $111,148 before dividing the marital estate. See Addendum 
B. Wife's $443,000 from her Lucky John home cannot be claimed as separate property 
because it was extensively co-mingled and became part of the marital estate when it was 
deposited into the joint Ameritrade account (#8730). (R. 449; 453). 
If the trial court had followed the presumptive rule and awarded each party their 
pre-marital and/or separate property, the marital estate would have been reduced by a 
total of $277,363 ($166,215 (+) $111,148) leaving a remaining balance of $1,149,997.60 
to be equally divided between the parties. Husband would then have been awarded his 
pre-marital and/or separate property ($166,215) plus his portion of the marital estate 
($574,998.80), which adjusts for his equitable portion of the re-payment to Suzie's Trust, 
for a total award of $741,213.80. Because this error raises questions of law this Court 
shall not accord the trial court's decision any deference. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE IT DID 
NOT DIVIDE THE ESTATE ON A FIFTY-FIFTY BASIS AS REQUIRED 
BY LAW. 
The general rule in divorce proceedings is that each party is entitled to all of his or 
her separate property and then fifty percent of the marital property. Bradford v. Bradford, 
1999 UT App 373, f26, 993 P.2d 887 (emphasis added); see also Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 
1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). "An unequal division of marital property, however, is 
only justified when the trial court 'memorializes in commendably detailed findings' the 
12 
exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution." Bradford, 1999 UT App 373 at 
|27 (emphasis added); see also Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, f27, 138 P.3d 84. In 
Davis, the court found exceptional circumstances warranted the unequal distribution of 
the parties' retirement accounts. Id. f 13. Specifically, the court found that husband's 
ability to ensure adequate retirement funds versus wife's inability to do the same was 
significant. Id. \\2. Moreover, the court found that husband could liquidate the real 
property he was awarded to also ensure adequate retirement funds. Id. Finally, the court 
found that wife had contributed significantly more money to the marital obligations than 
husband. Id Consequently, considering these facts in their totality, the Appellate Court 
upheld the trial court's finding that exceptional circumstances existed and supported a 
disparate distribution of the marital estate. 
Similarly, in Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, ]f29, 138 P.3d 84 the Appellate 
Court also found exceptional circumstances warranted an unequal distribution of the 
marital estate, specifically of the retirement accounts. In Riley\ the court was persuaded 
that because the family had relocated for the benefit of husband's career, because wife 
had liquidated her pre-marital assets to further the husband's career, because wife had 
contributed nearly $300,000 more than husband to the marriage, and because wife did not 
have an increased earning capacity over the course of the marriage, it was equitable to 
award wife her retirement accounts in full. Riley, 2006 UT App at f 29. These cases 
illustrate the rare occasions in which the trial court has found, th Appellate Court has 
upheld, the exceptional circumstances exception. 
Unlike Riley and Davis, the trial court in this case made no findings of 
"extraordinary circumstances." Instead of dividing the estate as required by law, the trial 
court abused its discretion by employing a ratio methodology unsupported by existing 
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case law or statute. The trial court determined, based on the value of Wife's pre-marital 
home and her trust account, that Wife brought 2.3 times more money into the marriage 
than Husband. (R. 458). The trial court then applied this ratio to divide the entire estate, 
without first accounting for and excluding from the respective pre-marital and/or separate 
property of the parties. Not only was it reversible error for the trial court to stray from the 
presumptive rule of a fifty-fifty division without a finding of "exceptional 
circumstances," but its ratio approach was also in error because the trial court did not 
identify all the pre-marital or separate property of the parties and it applied inaccurate 
values to that property which it did include. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law state that the parties' 
assets, both earned and lost during the marriage, were extensively co-mingled. (R. 452; 
453; 456; 458; 459). Accordingly, this co-mingled property became marital property and 
subject to a fifty-fifty division at the time of divorce. While it is undisputed that nearly 
$700,000 was lost from the marital estate in the stock market due, in part, to the 
Husband's conduct, the trial court made no such finding that this loss amounts to 
"exceptional circumstances" warranting an unequal and grossly unfair distribution of the 
marital estate. In fact, while the trial court noted that Husband was more culpable for the 
parties' financial losses, the trial court concluded that Wife was fully aware of Husband's 
activities and the losses were marital. (R. 452; 458; 459; 460). Also compelling and 
indicative that the trial court found this loss to be marital is the fact that the trial court 
equally awarded the loss carryover for tax purposes to each party. (R. 456). 
Consequently, because the trial court made no "exceptional circumstances" 
findings, the trial court should have followed the presumptive approach and divided the 
marital estate equally. By contrast, without any justification in law or in fact, the trial 
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court did otherwise and attempted to return each party to "the same relative position 
economically as when they entered the marriage . . . ." (R. 457). The law does not 
provide the trial court with the discretion to reach such a conclusion without detailed 
findings evidencing "exceptional circumstances." Moreover, even if the trial court 
believed the marital losses amounted to "exceptional circumstances," the trial court failed 
to make "commendably detailed findings" regarding its conclusion. Instead, its detailed 
findings illustrate that it found both parties liable for the marital losses even though it 
found Respondent beared the primary burden and responsibility. (R. 452). To reach its 
conclusion that Husband was more culpable, the trial court found the parties invested in 
their Ameritrade account at the behest of Husband. (R. 449). The trial court found that 
Husband did not contribute any separate money into the account but used his pre-marital 
funds to pay down the mortgage on the Monitor Drive home. (R. 449). The trial court 
also found that Husband had been warned not to engage in such trading activities and that 
Husband traded unwisely. (R. 450). Nonetheless, while the trial court made these 
findings, it also found Wife's testimony that she blindly signed the investment forms was 
"not highly credited." (R. 450). The trial court also found that while the Husband traded 
unwisely Wife gave Husband the money to do so. (R. 450). Moreover, the trial court 
found that Wife had to know what Husband was doing since she transferred the funds 
from Suzie's Trust. (R. 451). Therefore, there are no detailed findings that Husband's 
conduct amounts to an "extraordinary circumstance;" rather the findings illustrate the trial 
court's conclusion that both Husband and Wife are at fault. This error is an abuse of 
discretion as articulated in Finlayson. The trial court's decision to not divide the marital 
estate equally is not supported by the factual record and results in a serious inequity of 
property distribution in favor of Wife. Without the proper foundation to support the trial 
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court's deviation from the law, this approach contravenes the well-established standard in 
divorce proceedings. Therefore, the trial court committed reversible error when it failed 
to award each party a fifty percent interest in the marital estate. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF FACT BECAUSE 
IT INCORRECTLY VALUED BOTH THE PRE-MARITAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PARTIES AND THE OVERALL 
MARITAL ESTATE. 
The trial court made several accounting errors both in its valuation of what each 
party brought into the marriage and with regard to what each party received when they 
divorced. While certain valuation errors may be corrected if this Court follows the 
presumptive rule for dividing the marital estate on a fifty-fifty basis, other errors will 
have to be corrected if this Court follows the ratio approach used by the trial court. 
A. The trial court made numerous accounting errors when it determined the 
pre-marital value of each parties' assets. 
The trial court made numerous valuation errors to determine the value of each 
parties' pre-marital contributions and improperly excluded from its calculations the 
parties' separate property which had not been co-mingled during the marriage. In 
addition, the trial court's approach to determine the parties' pre-marital contributions fails 
to address the fact that these assets were extensively co-mingled during the marriage. 
Disregarding this fact, the trial court simply valued each parties' pre-marital assets, 
ignoring any separate property (although not pre-marital), and concluded that Wife 
brought 2.3 times more money into the marriage than Husband. (R. 458). The trial court 
then applied this 2.3 ratio to determine a proportionate division of the entire marital 
estate, and again wrongfully included property, which should have been separately 
distributed before dividing the marital estate. 
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i.) Wife brought $553,317 into the marriage not $700,000. 
Following this erroneous analysis, the trial court found Wife entered the marriage 
with an equity interest in her home and money from her trust, all totaled to be 
approximately $700,000. (R. 458). The trial court made no findings with regard to any 
other account, such as her Rollover IRA account, which was undisputedly pre-marital. 
Specifically, the trial court found that Wife received $640,000 from the sale of her Lucky 
John home (R. 458) and approximately $60,000 from her trust thus finding her pre-
marital contribution of $700,000. (R. 458). 
These findings are in error and not supported by the evidence admitted at trial. 
First, it is undisputed by the parties that Wife actually received $627,000 at the time she 
sold her Lucky John home not $640,000. (R. 384). In fact, the trial court contradicts 
itself on this point and specifically found that Wife had only $443,000 of her own equity 
in that home because of the $184,000 outstanding pre-marital loan to Suzie's Trust. (R. 
449, [^57 versus R. 458,1J102). Therefore, the trial court erred when it found Wife 
received $640,000 from the sale of her home. 
The trial court separately erred when it included Wife's personal trust as a pre-
marital asset with an approximate value of $60,000. (R. 458). Again, this is inaccurate 
because Wife's testimony is that her trust was worth approximately $47,000 at the time of 
marriage. (R. 383). Therefore, ascribing the values to the two assets which the trial 
court found to be pre-marital, based on the evidence admitted at trial, and in the parties' 
proposed findings of fact, the Wife's equity in her home ($443,000) and her trust 
($47,000) amount to Wife's pre-marital contribution of $490,000 rather than $700,000 as 
found by the trial court. 
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Notably, however, even this analysis is flawed because the trial court failed to 
include in its pre-marital calculation, Wife's pre-marital Rollover IRA account, in the 
amount of $63,317, which even the parties agreed was a pre-marital/separate asset. (R. 
320). Therefore, Wife's total pre-marital and/or separate assets, including the equity in 
her home which was actually co-mingled, were $553,317 rather than the $700,000 the 
trial court found; a difference of $146,683, which is significant. 
ii.) Husband brought $422,187 into the marriage not $300,000. 
The trial court determined that Husband brought into the marriage a total of 
$300,000 between his Jeremy Ranch home and various savings accounts. (R. 458). 
Again, the trial court's finding is erroneous because it failed to account for additional and 
valuable pre-marital property. In addition to his home, Husband had $89,277 in his Delta 
Retirement Plan, specifically in the Delta Family Care Savings Plan account (R. 389); he 
had pre-marital monies subsequently transferred to an RJ O'Brien account which had a 
balance, as of the trial date, of $52,000 (R. 390); and Husband had $5,910 from IBM 
stock earned prior to the marriage and held in a separate Ameritrade account (#1101). (R. 
319). In sum, Husband actually had separate property with a value of $402,187. In 
addition, and unaccounted for by the trial court, Husband received two $10,000 gifts from 
his father during the marriage which were maintained as separate property and now sit, in 
part, in a Zions Bank account, and in part in an RJ O'Brien account. (R. 390; 319). 
Hence, Husband's separate and/or pre-marital property was actually $422,187, not the 
$300,000 as found by the trial court. This is not an insignificant amount and discrepancy. 
Therefore, if this Court adopts the trial court's ratio approach, using the correct 
values of the assets, Wife brought only 1.3 times ($546,317 (+) $422,187) more value 
into the marriage than Husband, not the 2.3 times as erroneously found by the trial court. 
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B. The trial court used the wrong current fair market value for the marital 
estate and wrongfully calculated the value of the assets awarded to each party 
at the time of divorce. 
The trial court made factual errors in its valuation of the marital estate and the 
value of the assets each party was awarded at divorce. The first, and perhaps most 
significant error in its valuation of the marital estate is that the trial court found the 
present value of the marital residence to be $1,300,000. (R. 454). While the trial court 
correctly found the remaining mortgage balance to be $567,000, based on the evidence 
admitted at trial and agreed to by the parties, it concluded that there was a remaining 
equity interest of $732,420. (R.454). This is a factual error and contradicts the 
stipulation entered into by the parties and admitted into the record at trial. Prior to trial, 
the parties stipulated to a current fair market value of the marital residence of $1,350,000, 
less the debt encumbering the home with an actual net equity of $783,000 rather than the 
$732,420 as found by the trial court. (R. 394; 317). Adjusting for this error increases the 
overall value of the marital estate by $50,580 and increases the overall value of assets 
awarded to Wife by the same amount. 
i.) Wife was awarded a disproportionately higher share of the estate. 
The trial court found that Wife had approximately $70,000 in various accounts, at 
the time of trial, which were largely created since separation. (R. 459). The trial court 
found these various accounts to include: a business and personal account with Wells 
Fargo, a Simple IRA, a SEP IRA, a 401(k) rollover, and a Creating Community 401(k). 
(R. 461). The trial court subsequently awarded Wife these accounts, disregarding their 
marital nature, concluding that her total award, including the marital residence, equaled 
nearly $800,000. (R. 459). However, these "various" accounts, held solely in Wife's 
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name, amount to far more than the $70,000 the trial court assigned. The balances, at the 
time of trial, were as follows: 
• Wells Fargo (business account): $68,647 
• Wells Fargo (personal) 
• Simple IRA 
• Schwab SEP IRA 
• Schwab 40 l(k) 
• Schwab Rollover IRA 
$19,2334 
$10,935 
$14,196 
$29,679 
$63,317 
TOTAL: $206,007 
(R. 391). Consistent with Husband's duty to marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's finding, the only finding in support of the trial court's position that the "various" 
accounts equal nearly $70,000 is that "Petitioner's combined balance in her banking and 
investment accounts is approximately $70,700." (R. 461, ^[118). However, as the 
evidence admitted at trial, as well as the proposed findings of fact submitted by both 
parties substantiates this is clearly erroneous. There is nothing in the record which 
supports the trial court's finding that Wife's various accounts equal $70,700. Therefore, 
applying the trial court's approach, but ascribing the actual values of the awarded assets, 
Wife was awarded $783,000 as equity in the marital residence plus $206,007 from her 
"various" accounts. In addition, Wife was also awarded the parties' 2004 tax refund in 
the amount of $19,486 (R. 322; 461), and her personal trust account with a balance of 
$47,831. (R. 461; 320). Therefore, Wife was awarded assets from the marital estate 
totaling $1,056,324. Moreover, assuming this Court agrees with Husband's dissipation 
4
 While the balance in Wife's personal account (#8033), as of April 11, 2006 was 
$19,233, this represents an unreconciled balance. Exh. 37 and 48 (received at trial) 
evidence that on April 17 and 24, 2006, Wife transferred two amounts from her business 
account (#5638) into her personal account, totaling $41,248.60. Because these statements 
are on different dates, they cannot be reconciled and fail to evidence the deposits in transit 
between these accounts. Accordingly, Husband claims the marital estate was dissipated 
by Wife in the amount of $41,248.60. (R. 409). 
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argument set forth in footnote 3, Wife actually received an additional $41,248.60 
resulting in a total award of $1,097,572.60. This far exceeds the $800,000 the trial court 
found it had awarded Wife. Admittedly, the trial court also assigned Wife the remaining 
marital debt of $154,000 to Suzie's Trust and an equitable payment to Husband of 
$100,000. (R. 460). Therefore, Wife will actually leave the marriage with a total of 
$843,572.60, with no other outstanding liabilities. This is nearly $300,000 more than 
Wife actually entered the marriage with even including the equity from her pre-marital 
home which was co-mingled during the marriage. 
ii.) Husband was awarded less than his proper share of the marital estate. 
In stark contrast, Husband was awarded his Delta Retirement Account in the 
amount of $375,535. (R. 459; 394). This amount includes the $89,277 from his Family 
Care Savings Plan which was unquestionably pre-marital money. (R. 389; 325; 411). 
The trial court also awarded Husband his personal checking account which the trial court 
found had a balance of $30,000. (R. 459). The trial court additionally awarded Husband 
$12,600 from the parties' Wasatch Ice investment. (R. 461). However, the trial court's 
accounting is in error because Husband's personal checking account balance already 
included the $12,600 refund from Wasatch Ice. (R. 410). Therefore, Husband had a 
checking account balance of $18,400 (R. 326), in addition to the Wasatch Ice Refund of 
$12,600. (R. 410). Finally, the trial court awarded Husband the remaining accounts held 
in his name. (R. 461). These accounts included Husband's two RJ O'Brien accounts 
totaling $70,000 (R. 390); his separate Ameritrade account (#1101) of $5,910 (R. 319); 
the joint Ameritrade account (#8730) of $315 (R. 319); and his Zions Bank account of 
$1,028. (R. 390). In sum, including the $100,000 equalizing payment from Wife, 
Husband was awarded $583,838; nearly $300,000 less than Wife. In addition, the trial 
21 
court found that Husband's retirement funds, in particular the MPPP account (a sub-
account of the Delta Retirement Account) in the amount of $103,098, were uncertain and 
speculative at best. R. 459-60; R. 556; TT: 460-62). Therefore, Husband's total award 
may more accurately be closer to $480,740. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce in favor of Husband because the trial court did not divide the 
marital estate as required by law and it made several critical factual errors when it 
determined the parties' pre-marital and separate assets as well as the value of the marital 
estate at the time of divorce. The errors result in a substantial inequity of the property 
distribution and amount to an abuse of discretion. 
Dated this ^ J a y of April 2007. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS <S£SWENSON 
IRK W. SESSIONS 
ELIZABETH A. SCHULTE 
Attorneys for Appellant/Respondent 
Michael Hodge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIANE HODGE, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
MICHAEL HODGE, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 054500189 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck on Thursday the 8 
day of June and Friday, the 9 day of June, 2006. Petitioner was present and represented by 
counsel, Kenneth A. Okazaki and Lori W. Nelson. Respondent was present and represented by 
counsel, Christina I. Miller. 
The Court, having previously bifurcated the financial matters from the child related 
matters, and having heard testimony and admitted exhibits, now hereby makes the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties are husband and wife having been married on the 8th, day of August, 
1998. 
2. The parties separated on the 30th day of October, 2004, though on occasions 
thereafter until approximately March 2005 they remained in the same marital home. 
3. Petitioner filed a Petition for Divorce on or about the 2nd day of September, 2005, 
requesting certain relief, including that she be granted a Decree of Divorce from Respondent on 
the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final upon entry. 
4. Respondent filed an Answer on or about the 8th day of November, 2005. 
5. Petitioner filed a Certificate of Readiness six days later, on or about the 14th day 
of November, 2005. 
6. Petitioner filed a Motion to Bifurcate which was denied on or about the 15th day 
of November, 2005. 
7. The Court held a scheduling conference on the 7th day of December, 2005, at 
which time a trial date was fixed. 
8. Respondent filed a Motion for Temporary Orders on the 30th day of December, 
2005, which was heard on the 20th day of March, 2006. At that time the Court entered an oral 
order which was signed the 1st day of May, 2006. That order required the parties to abide by the 
interim agreement which obligated Respondent to pay one-half the mortgage on the marital 
residence, awarded Petitioner the use and occupancy of the marital residence and ordered her to 
pay the expenses thereon, with the exception of one-half the mortgage. Each of the parties was 
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awarded their own vehicles and Petitioner was ordered to pay Respondent $2,000 per month in 
alimony for the months of April, May, and June 2006. The Court appointed a parent-time 
evaluator to assess the best interests of Petitioner's children based on Respondent's request for 
parent-time with his step-children. The Court later incorporated Respondent's objections into a 
subsequent order. 
9. On or about the 2nd day of May the Court entered an order for discovery. 
10. Respondent filed a Motion to Continue on or about the 26th day of May on the 
basis that the parent-time evaluation had not been completed. The Court held a telephone 
conference on the 31st day of May, 2006, and ordered that trial would not be continued but the 
financial issues would be bifurcated from the child related issues and trial on the child related 
issues would be held on the 23rd day of August, if necessary. 
JURISDICTION AND GROUNDS 
11. Irreconcilable difference have arisen between the parties, which differences make 
the marriage irreparable, notwithstanding the efforts the parties made through counseling to 
preserve the marriage. 
12. Petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences, the same to become final upon entry. 
13. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter as both parties are residents of Summit 
County, State of Utah, and were for three months immediately prior to the filing of the action. 
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CHILD RELATED ISSUES 
14. There have been no children born issues of this marriage. However, Petitioner 
has two children from a previous marriage, to wit: 
a. Elizabeth Rinehart, born September 28, 1990 
b. Jackson L. Rinehart, born December 21, 1993 
15. Petitioner and Respondent were ordered to obtain a parenting time evaluation. 
Based upon Petitioner's insistence that the parties retain Dr. Goldsmith to prepare the evaluation, 
the evaluation has been delayed and will not be available until approximately mid-July 2006. 
16. Petitioner may file a motion in sufficient time to allow both parties the 
opportunity to fully brief the issue of Respondent's standing or right to seek parent-time with 
Petitioner's children. The briefing should be sufficiently in advance of the trial date to allow the 
Court to determine in advance if that date should be stricken. 
ALIMONY AND THE PARTIES EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME 
17. Respondent is 47 years of age, is in good health and suffers from no disability. 
In 1981, Respondent joined the Air Force and obtained his pilot's license. In 1989, Mike 
obtained employment with Delta Airlines and is currently employed by Delta Airlines as a 
captain. Respondent flies various schedules and flies approximately 70-80 hours per month. 
18. In 2004, Respondent earned a gross annual income of approximately $198,776. 
In 2005, Respondent earned a gross annual income of approximately $150,655.33. As of April 
17, 2006, Respondent earned a gross income of approximately $40,718. 
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19. On May 31,2006, the Delta pilot's union ratified a concessionary agreement 
which will save Delta approximately $280,000,000 per year. Among the concessions, was a 
fourteen percent reduction in pay for all pilots from the rates they received in 2005. The pilot's 
rates in 2005 were a thirty-three and one-half percent reduction from their rates in 2004. 
20. The Court finds Mike is capable of earning a gross income of $129,564, or 
$10,797 per month (a fourteen percent reduction from 2005) for purposes of determining an 
equitable amount of alimony. 
21. Respondent earns his income flying for Delta Airlines. Respondent's 2005 
income was based on flying an average of 10 days per month. The remainder of the month 
Respondent does not work and is capable of supplementing his income from secondary sources. 
22. Respondent has recently become licensed as a real estate agent in Park City and 
will have the ability to supplement his income and earn the same income as Petitioner has 
earned. 
23. Respondent claims monthly expenses of approximately $8,000 - $9,000 and 
anticipates greater expenses when he purchases a home. The Court finds he is a single man, 
with no child support and he is a captain with Delta Airlines, as noted above. The Court finds 
Respondent's claimed expenses should be reduced as they are not reasonable or necessary. 
24. Respondent's claimed needs are reduced in the areas of gifts, coaching, gas, 
dental, food supplements, food in general, charity (which is voluntary), investment expense, 
counseling, bike costs, telephone and cell phone, entertainment and travel (he flies for free), 
retirement, and vehicle. 
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25. The Court finds Respondent's claimed expenses demonstrate some lack of 
credibility. In total Respondent's claimed expenses for dining out, food, food supplements, and 
meals while on trips (most of which are reimbursed by Delta), totals over $1,200 per month for 
one person. The Court finds that even for someone who exercises vigorously, as Respondent 
appears to do, that amount of food is not reasonable or necessary. 
26. The Court finds this is not a major factor, but was one of the factors the Court 
uses in determining overall credibility. The Court finds a person who attempts to convince the 
Court his needs include a food budget of over $1,200 per month is not, in the eyes of the Court, a 
person that the Court is required to believe. 
27. The Court finds Respondent's legitimate expenses do not exceed $5,000 per 
month. As being fully capable of earning, at a very minimum, $129,000 per year, Respondent 
has not shown a need for alimony and that either as a pilot or real estate agent he is capable of 
meeting his own needs. 
28. The Court finds that Respondent did support Petitioner and her two children 
during the marriage, but this does not entitle him to ongoing support given the facts and 
circumstances of this case. 
29. The Court also finds the Respondent, in his employment and given the nature of 
pilots with Delta and their work, Respondent could, given his seniority level, earn more as a pilot 
than he is now earning. The Court finds and hereby concludes that Respondent could, if he 
desired, fly a different airplane in which he is more senior than his current assignment in a 767 
and thus fly more and earn more, even though his per-hour pay may be reduced. The Court does 
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not suggest this should occur, but does find that Respondent made clear in his testimony in 
various ways the he has not sought to maximize his income but has sought a balance to make 
sufficient income and enjoy life. 
30. The Court finds Respondent's statement "who does not want to work less" was 
one such comment and the further evidence of his emphasis in training for and competing in 
bicycle events. The Court finds no fault in Respondent's chosen lifestyle and desire to achieve 
balance, but does find it impacts the alimony analysis. Utah law requires the Court to analyze a 
party's ability to contribute to their own support when that party is requesting alimony and even 
at his reduced wage, Respondent can meet those needs. Furthermore, the Court finds 
Respondent could work more and therefore earn more as a pilot and could possibly earn some 
income working part-time as a real estate agent. 
31. The Court finds Respondent is not entitled to alimony as he is fully capable of 
meeting his own needs as a pilot and through his own efforts, which have been substantial. The 
Court also finds that if Respondent achieves even part of the success attained by Petitioner in the 
real estate field, his income would be greater than his income as a pilot. 
32. Petitioner is 47 years of age, in good health and suffers from no disability. 
Petitioner is a successful real estate agent and recently obtained her brokers certification. 
Petitioner started her real estate career in 2002. Petitioner is not employed by Prudential but is 
an independent contractor associated with Prudential. 
33. The Court finds that no one can predict commission income in real estate or any 
other field but history is the best indicator. Based on Petitioner's gross income in 2003, 
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(approximately $65,000), in 2004 (approximately $328,000), in 2005 (approximately $740,000) 
and in 2006 to date (mid-April), which, when annualized and with adjustments, would total 
$750,000, that Petitioner's income is approximately $475,000 per year gross, or approximately 
$40,000 per month, which is the Court's best estimate given the listings and inventory. 
34. The Court finds Petitioner's work history or income prior to 2002 when she 
became a real estate agent was not revealed in full by the testimony, nor her income other than in 
1998. 
35. Notwithstanding Petitioner's argument that her income will go down and 
Respondent's argument it will remain the same as it was in 2005, the Court finds it cannot 
predict what Petitioner may earn and the parties' expectations that the Court fix a future income 
for Petitioner in a commission based job are not reasonable. 
36. The Court does find that there is no evidence to support the allegation or 
conclusion that Petitioner will have income equal to her income in 2005 every year. Nor does 
the Court find there is evidence to support the notion Petitioner will be a pauper. The Court 
does not find credible Petitioner's testimony that her market will "dry-up" when the East-West 
Resort package is sold. The Court does find that Petitioner will do well even after the East-West 
Resort is sold out and Petitioner starts over her real estate career. 
37. The Court does find that Petitioner's real estate income has been earned in the 
resort/second home market but that she will earn enough income to support herself and her 
children. 
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38. The Court does not find this is an appropriate case where income is in any fashion 
to be equalized. During the marriage from 1998 until 2003, Petitioner's income was not shown 
by the testimony, but evidently was relatively minimal ($24,000 at the time of marriage) 
compared to the current levels. The parties lived off Respondent's salary largely until 2002 
when Petitioner became a realtor. Thus, the parties' standard of living did not substantially 
change until 2004, shortly before their October 2004 separation. The Court finds the evidence 
supports the conclusion that the elevated standard of living commenced sometime in 2004 when 
Petitioner began to receive larger commissions. 
39. The Court finds the parties 2003 standard of living to be based on Petitioner's 
income of $65,000 and Respondent's income of $189,912. Respondent's income from 2001 and 
2002 was substantially similar to his 2003 income ($190,132 in 2001 and $187,726 in 2002). 
Thus, the Court finds this is not a case where it needs to balance the "misery" of insufficient 
income. The Court also finds this is not a case where an established standard of living was in 
place for a lengthy period of time before separation. Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5 (8)(c) 
provides the date of separation is considered as the date to which the Court should look in 
determining the standard of living for purposes of awarding alimony. 
40. Prior to the parties' separation in October 2004, the parties had been married just 
over six years. This is neither a short nor long term marriage, but the Court finds it is closer to 
being a short term marriage than a long term marriage. Thus, the Court finds the standard of 
living that exists as of trial, or in 2005, or even to some extent during the later part of 2004, is not 
one which is or was established and one that merits an attempt by the Court to provide 
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Respondent with an enhanced standard of living beyond what was experience during almost lal 
of the marriage. 
41. The Court finds Petitioner has earned much more money since separation than 
that which was available to the parties during almost all of their marriage. The standard of 
living of the parties while together was not as Respondent asserts. During most of the marriage 
the parties lived on Respondent's earnings. 
42. The Court finds that Petitioner did not have meaningful income until 2002 and the 
parties separated in late 2004. Prior to separation the parties lived on less than $200,000 and 
that paid all the living expenses for four people, the parties and Petitioner's two children. 
43. The Court finds that income equalization is not appropriate in this case and 
further that Respondent is not entitled support based on an enhanced standard of living. The 
Court finds, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5 (8)(c) that the standard of living 
enjoyed at the time of separation is the appropriate standard of living on which to base its 
analysis of alimony and Respondent is fully capable of supporting himself at that standard of 
living with no contribution from Petitioner in the form of either income equalization or alimony. 
44. The Court finds that because Respondent has not demonstrated a need for alimony 
the other factors need not be considered. As such, the Court is not considering Petitioner's 
ability to pay alimony. The Court also finds, however, in considering the parties claimed 
expenses, that Petitioner's expenses are not credible, but also finds they are not relevant. The 
Court finds Petitioner could certainly pay alimony, despite her claim to the contrary and that her 
claimed business expenses are not considered credible by the Court. The Court emphasizes, 
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however, that neither Petitioner's business expenses nor her personal expenses are relevant to the 
analysis as Respondent can fully meet his needs on his income. 
45. Thus, even if Respondent's expenses increase should he purchase a home, a 
rational approach to life would allow a large mortgage payment on what Respondent currently 
earns by his own efforts. 
46. The Court also finds this is not the situation, as argued by Respondent, where he 
should be compared to a "stay-at-home mom" who supported the "breadwinner" by raising the 
children and allowing the breadwinner to earn income and thus should share in the increased 
income of that breadwinner. 
47. Respondent, during much of the marriage, did not do more than his share to take 
care of the children while Petitioner worked. Thus, he is not entitled to the benefit of his 
support. Furthermore, the Court finds Respondent was not in any way responsible for 
Petitioner's increase in income, either form his support or from his efforts in other areas such as 
raising children. 
48. The Court finds that although Respondent encouraged Petitioner to become 
employed in the real estate field, his support after Petitioner obtained her real estate license was 
minimal and indeed, to call it support would be stretching the evidence to support an 
unwarranted conclusion. 
49. The weight of the evidence supports the finding that Respondent did not like 
Petitioner being at work and away from him and Petitioner's children and, in fact, Respondent 
encouraged Petitioner to work less so she could earn an income of perhaps $100,000 per year. 
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50. The Court finds Respondent did not support Petitioner by attending functions with 
her but instead continued his personal activities such as mountain biking and training. 
51. The Court finds that Respondent is a fully capable airline captain, and previously 
an instructor, who was married to someone who was fortunate enough to become involved in an 
occupation, late in their marriage, that recently earned great income and will likely continue to 
do so at least in the near future. 
52. The Court finds Respondent was not, in any way, responsible for Petitioner's 
increased income, and he should not, therefore, share in that increase as it has come almost 
entirely after separation. 
53. The Court finds the income Petitioner has achieved is not the product of 
Respondent's supportive efforts in any major part, but is largely the product of her own effort, 
while raising her two children with some assistance from Respondent. 
54. As such, the Court finds that no alimony should be awarded to either party. 
Furthermore, the Court finds that Respondent's request for "income equalization" for the years 
of 2004, 2005 and 2006 to date is not reasonable or equitable under the circumstances and that 
request should be denied. 
INSURANCE 
55. The Court finds that each party should obtain and/or maintain their own medical 
and dental insurance and pay any costs, premiums and/or deductibles associated therewith within 
30 days from the date the Decree of Divorce is entered, if they have not already done so. 
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56. The Court finds that Respondent acquired a $250,000 term life insurance policy 
with USAA and a $250,000 term life insurance policy with Harvey Watt & Company. The 
policies have no cash value. Respondent should be awarded said policies, as his sole and 
separate property, with no claim by Petitioner. 
STOCK LOSSES 
57. Subsequent to the parties' marriage, in 2000, Petitioner sold the Lucky John 
Home, for which she received net proceeds of $627,000. Of those proceeds, $443,000 was from 
Petitioner's trust and $184,000 was from Susan's trust. These proceeds were placed in an 
Ameritrade investment account opened by the parties at Respondent's behest. Respondent did 
not contribute any of his separate money to the Ameritrade account, rather, he opted to invest his 
premarital funds by paying down the mortgage on the parties' home located on Monitor Drive. 
("Monitor Drive Home".) 
58. Before opening the Ameritrade account, Respondent determined, based on his 
own efforts and contact with others, that he could make money by investing in the stock market, 
dealing in what is commonly considered as a speculative activity, dealing in what are called 
"covered calls." Indeed, the Court finds on one of the applications for modification of the 
account, the term "speculative" was checked by Respondent. The parties spent a great deal of 
time and testimony on the issue of this account and the resulting loss during trial 
59. The Court finds, based on the documents and testimony, Petitioner signed the 
documents to open the account and those applications contain information about Petitioner's and 
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Respondent's supposed investing experience. The Court finds the applications were not very 
truthful. 
60. The Court finds that while Petitioner may maintain she did not read or understand 
the documents, the Court finds that Petitioner is a talented and accomplished person, and her 
testimony that she blindly signed the documents is not highly credited. 
61. The Court finds Respondent began investing initially with approximately $50,000 
and did reasonably well. The Court finds the stock market, at least the stock Respondent was 
trading, did not do well in 2000, and eventually the Respondent used and lost all $610,000 from 
the sale of the Lucky John Home, as margin calls of the stock market declined, particularly the 
tech stocks in which Respondent was dealing. 
62. The Court finds Respondent had been warned by others, specifically Petitioner's 
financial advisor, not to engage in such trading as it was too speculative. The Court finds that 
advice from investment advisors is and can be completely contrary, i.e., do not buy bonds, buy 
bonds, etc. 
63. The Court finds Respondent traded unwisely, admittedly, but Petitioner had to 
give Respondent money to do so. The Court does not credit Petitioner's testimony that she did 
not know what Respondent was doing, or that she only approved trading for approximately 
$50,000. 
64. The Court finds that it may well have been the original understanding to only 
invest $50,000, but that changed over time. The Court does not find Respondent is being 
forthright in his testimony about advising Petitioner "every step of the way", and the Court finds 
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that neither party was entirely credible in their testimony concerning how the money was lost, 
and who knew what. The Court finds it is inconceivable that Petitioner believed the money from 
the sale of the Lucky John home was "just sitting" in the Ameritrade account, and that 
Respondent was merely "playing" with $50,000 of it. This finding is particularly born out by the 
later event of Petitioner releasing an additional $100,000 from Susan's trust in 2001 after being 
told by Respondent that he had lost the original $610,000. 
65. The Court finds that after the $610,000 was lost by Respondent, that Respondent 
begged Petitioner's forgiveness for losing her money, and made a commitment to repay the 
sums, acknowledging all blame and responsibility for losing the money. 
66. The Court finds in May 2001, in an effort to recoup the losses, Respondent 
borrowed an additional $100,000 from Susan's trust to invest. The Court finds Petitioner knew 
what Respondent was doing and had to transfer the funds from Susan's trust. The Court finds 
this transfer was an act of desperation in an attempt to recoup some of the losses. The Court 
finds those funds were also lost in their entirety. 
67. The Court finds that when additional money was borrowed from Susan's trust in 
2001, and invested into the Ameritrade account, and also lost by Respondent, Petitioner simply 
had to know where the money was going and what it was being used for. The Court finds that 
as Petitioner was the sole trustee of the accounts, Respondent could not access the money from 
Susan's trust without Petitioner's approval and without her action. 
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68. The Court finds that while there was no testimony about how this was 
accomplished, what Respondent said to Petitioner to convince her transfer to additional funds, 
the Court finds Petitioner simply had to know it was for a similar purpose as the original funds. 
69. The Court finds that although the losses in the stock market were marital, the 
Respondent bears the primary burden and responsibility. The Court finds Petitioner basically 
"sat by" and though Petitioner is a competent person, she is not versed in such stock market 
activity and did not fully appreciate the speculative nature of the trading, nor did she know 
exactly what Respondent was doing in the stock market. 
70. The Court finds Respondent did not tell Petitioner exactly what he was doing, nor 
how the funds were disappearing and being lost. The Court finds that had the trading resulted in 
a large profit, turning approximately $600,000 into $1,000,000,000, for example, certainly 
Petitioner could and would and should claim she would be entitled to benefit from that increase. 
71. The Court finds the decision to "lose" the money was not a decision anyone 
made, but the decision to invest, was in reality, the decision of both parties, and the unfortunate 
eventuality of the staggering economic losses is one that both must bear, though perhaps not 
equally. 
72. The Court finds Petitioner originally desired to use the proceeds of the Lucky 
John Home to reduce the mortgage on the Monitor Drive Home, but again, the Court finds that 
Petitioner knew Respondent was "playing the market", but the Court specifically finds and 
determines Petitioner did not know exactly what Respondent was doing, nor did she know the 
exact nature of the speculative activity involved, buying covered calls. Petitioner did not know 
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the money had been lost until it was gone, and the Court finds she was not involved in the daily 
fluctuations, mostly negative, of the market. 
73. The Court finds that a gain would be attributable to Petitioner and so was the loss. 
The money was co-mingled, although Petitioner's premarital, became marital when Petitioner 
allowed the Respondent to unwisely use it to trade in the stock market. 
74. Prior to the parties' marriage, Petitioner was the beneficiary of a trust established 
by her parents, which was her own personal trust. ("Personal Trust".) The Personal Trust held 
cash and property assets, which was funded solely by inherited or gifted assets prior to the 
parties' marriage. A home and real property located at 1550 Lucky John, Park City, Utah, 
("Lucky John Home"), was held in this Personal Trust, which was valued at $740,000 at the time 
of the parties' marriage. 
75. Petitioner is the trustee of a trust for her sister, Susan, who is permanently 
disabled. ("Susan's Trust".) Petitioner, as trustee of Susan's Trust, manages all of Susan's 
finances and care. Petitioner determined that it would be in Susan's best interest to have her 
reside with Petitioner and her children to avoid placement of Susan in an out-of-home facility, 
and provide Susan valuable socialization and a comfortable family setting. 
76. Petitioner borrowed $184,000 from Susan's Trust to pay down the mortgage on 
the Lucky John Home and move Susan in to live with her and her two children. 
77. Petitioner is the sole trustee of Susan's trust and she may act as she deems proper 
in Susan's interest. Petitioner's brother, Arthur Anderson, is an alternate trustee of Susan's 
trust. 
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78. In August 1998, the parties purchased a home and real property located at 2563 
Monitor Drive ("Monitor Drive Home"), which was purchased for $975,180.52. Each of the 
parties placed $20,000 of personal funds down to purchase the Monitor Drive Home. 
79. The Court finds the parties borrowed an additional $254,000 from Susan's trust 
put toward the mortgage balance on the home. It was understood between the parties that they 
would commit to repay this loan. 
80. In September, 1998, Respondent sold his premarital home and received net 
proceeds in the amount of $240,000. Respondent invested the proceeds of this sale to pay down 
the mortgage on the Monitor home, bringing the balance of the mortgage on the Monitor Home 
to $441,000. 
81. The Court finds that Respondent invested an additional $30,000 for the Monitor 
Drive home. 
82. In April 2000, the parties sold the Monitor Drive home. 
83. The parties utilized $200,000 from the proceeds of the Monitor Drive home to 
partially repay Susan's trust. 
84. The parties then purchased a home and real property, which is the parties' current 
marital residence, located at 2964 American Saddler Drive. 
85. The Court finds the American Saddler Drive home has a present value of 
$1,300,000, with a mortgage balance of $567,000 for a net equity of $732,420. 
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PROPERTY AND ASSETS 
86. The Court finds that Petitioner should be awarded the American Saddler Drive 
home and all equity therein, utilizing the funds contained therein to pay her personal trust, 
Susan's trust, and return her premarital down payment. 
87. The Court finds that the home should be refinanced within sixty days from the 
date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in Petitioner's own name. 
88. The Court finds that during the marriage, the parties acquired personal property 
and household furnishings. Petitioner has retained and has possession of the majority of the 
parties' marital personal property and household furnishings 
89. The Court finds that further trial time, specifically that trial time scheduled for 
August 23, 2006, is reserved for child related issues and shall not be utilized for personal 
property issues. The Court finds that if the parties cannot resolve the personal property issue 
through mediation, that the Court will rule based upon the testimony heard at trial, coupled with 
the exhibits received. The Court finds that very little testimony was received, but the Court did 
receive exhibits from each party. 
90. The Court finds that during the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a 2003 
Acrua MDX valued at approximately $19,000, a 2002 Acura MDX valued at approximately 
$22,000, and a 2001 Subaru Outback, valued at approximately $12,000. 
91. The Court finds Petitioner should be awarded the exclusive use, possession and 
ownership of the 2002 Acura MDX, subject to any and all liability thereon, as her sole and 
separate property. 
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92. The Court finds Respondent should be awarded the exclusive use, possession and 
ownership of the 2003 Acura MDX, and the 2001 Subaru Outback, subject to any and all liability 
thereon, as his sole and separate property. 
93. The Court finds that each of the parties should contact his or her lienholders 
within thirty days from the date of the Decree of Divorce, and have the other party's name 
removed from the loan, lease, title, and any insurances associated with either parties' 
automobiles. Each party is ordered to send an authorization to the other party's lienholder to 
remove his or her name, if necessary. 
94. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired an interest in a limited 
partnership known as New Sea Cliffs. The parties' interest in New Sea Cliffs is not salable or 
transferable and has limited value, except for tax write-off. The Court finds that each party 
should be awarded one-half of the interest in New Sea Cliffs, Hawaii, subject to any and all 
liability thereon, as his or her sole and separate property. 
95. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a loss carryover due to the 
loss of money in the stock market. This loss carryover can be utilized on the parties' future tax 
returns. Inasmuch as the Court finds the money invested in the stock market was co-mingled, 
martial funds, each party should be awarded one-half of the loss carryover. 
96. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired Wasatch Ice stock. After 
the parties' separation, the stock was redeemed; however, Respondent received the redemption 
check and deposited it into his account. The Court finds the Respondent should be awarded that 
Wasatch Ice redemption proceeds in the amount of $12,600. 
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97. During the course of the marriage, the Petitioner acquired a business known as 
Creating Community. Petitioner should be awarded that business as her sole and separate 
property, with no claim by Respondent. Petitioner should assume and pay any and all liabilities 
associated with the business, forever holding Respondent harmless therefrom. 
PROPERTY DIVISION 
98. In the attempt to be equitable as to property division, the Court has struggled. 
The Court does not find this is a case for equalization of assets or income. The Court finds that 
each of the parties came into the marriage with assets, with the income of one party, Petitioner, 
changing dramatically since separation. The Court does not accept Respondent's approach that 
equalization should occur, nor does it accept Petitioner's position. The Court does not believe 
the parties should be restored to their premarital position as the marriage is not of such short 
duration that Respondent's contributions to the family should be discounted entirely, as 
Respondent supported the family during most of the marriage. 
99. The Court is not capable of determining with precision the amounts that should be 
offset, credited, backed out, or put in someone's column, as the parties seem to do with great 
ability. The Court finds its ultimate result is an attempt to be fair and equitable, given the facts 
and circumstances of this case. The Court's basic intent is for the parties to leave the marriage in 
the same relative position economically as when they entered the marriage, with some minor 
adjustments and modifications, due to Respondent's principal fault in losing much of what the 
Court has found to be the marital estate and because of Petitioner's enhanced income at the 
present time. 
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100. The Court finds that because it is not such a short term marriage, the Court does 
not have to restore the parties to the exact condition which existed at the time of marriage, but 
does find that this is a case where each party should be able to basically "walk away" in the same 
economic proportion as when they entered the marriage, and Respondent should not benefit to 
the extent he believes he should because the marriage "produced" a high income party. The 
Court does not believe, and does not find the standard of living should be equalized as the major 
income from Petitioner has been, in large part, realized after separation and the appropriate 
standard of living to be considered is the time of separation, pursuant to U.C.A. §30-3-5(8)(c). 
101. The Court finds Respondent brought into the marriage, from the sale of his 
Jeremy Ranch home, approximately $255,000, plus some other savings, and his income, which 
supported the family. In round figures, the Court finds Respondent brought premarital money, 
which was all co-mingled, of approximately $300,000 into the marriage. 
102. The Court finds Petitioner brought the proceeds from the sale of the Lucky John 
home in the approximate sum of $640,000, plus money in her personal trust, for a total of 
approximately $700,000. 
103. The Court finds Petitioner brought approximately 2.3 times the amount 
Respondent brought in. The Court finds this does not include the various loans from Susan's 
trust. 
104. The Court finds of the approximate $700,000 Petitioner brought into the marriage, 
$600,000 was lost. The Court also finds that none of Respondent's original property, premarital 
and later co-mingled, was lost. 
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105. The Court finds that while the loss suffered by Petitioner is marital, the principal 
reason is the activity and conduct of Respondent. The Court finds that Petitioner did not stop the 
conduct, and therefore, bears some responsibility. 
106. However, the Court finds Petitioner brought just over twice as many assets into 
the marriage, as did Respondent, and Petitioner lost approximately 85% of those funds. 
107. The Court has not been able to calculate any formula or precise figure that should 
be attributable to Respondent concerning the loss, but does find his proportion of the fault is 
greater than that of Petitioner in losing the money. 
108. The Court finds the parties co-mingled their funds and obtained a home now with 
equity of approximately $732,000. As noted above, this property should be awarded to 
Petitioner. The Court finds Petitioner has approximately $70,000 in various accounts on her 
own, created largely since separation. Thus, Petitioner leaves the marriage with more than she 
entered, with approximately $800,000 and she entered with approximately $700,000. Petitioner 
has repaid much of the "loans" taken from Susan's trust, and some remains to be repaid. The 
Court finds Respondent has not participated in that repayment. 
109. The Court finds Respondent's $300,000 has not been "lost", but has become 
marital, as it was used to purchase the homes, which now end in Petitioner's ownership. The 
Court finds Respondent has approximately, as best the Court can calculate, though there is 
uncertainty of course what the Delta pension may do and what may disappear to either Delta or 
the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, that Respondent has the sum of approximately 
$375,000. The Court also finds that Respondent has $30,000 in checking. 
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I I i i Tlie Court, finds that it was not made clear from the evidence, and the Court 
cannot asccuan - • . • i* "! 
of Delta Airlim v ^ *\K < >urt. uivine He\;hi"iit\ ic k eerlan ty ol those retiru .*si 
accounts, beliews !^.>pt:tu*en ,a *.^  
entered with just under half of the assets 'which Petitioner now" has. 
1 1 1
 . ; ; finds, however, that because those iictiicniciit iuiuls aic i,ei Luu\\ i 
w o r t j 1 w n a t t j l e e x j1 1 j : ) I t s s j l o w o n papCr> the Court believes the Petitioner should provide the sum 
of $100,000 to Respondent. 
finds Respondent should be given an equitable lien on the A merican 
Saddler 1 )nve in;me until that amount is paid by Petitioner, The Conn . .uas that Petitioner may 
,:
 •* » • * i ; - r N mi lent that sum within 120 days of the final Decree of Divorce. 
-< Court finds that given that Respondent was mainly responsible for the i~~:~~ 
f\ 'iiioner, and given tliai one :< «an was for the very puroos*- oi* m\ estmg, and given ±,u 
I"n liliuiic i v\ ill li i Il iiiliil he lesponsible Inn n paying lli.il loan Ihal i i|intv dot's tint rrt|imr 
Respondent be awarded anything further. However, the Court believes he is entitled to the sum 
mil 1|J 10(1,000 as In ftiuiided loi Iht1 kiiitih lot iiiosl ol 11 it* it i.linage. 
114 I lie Court finds, in making this order, it is attempting to avoid tedious 
calculations to w lucli the parlies ivuli! ini agioc I lit;' \MIII dot s liml howem, thai e.k h ol Iht 
parties brought premarital assets into the marriage, Petitioner more than Respondent, and that 
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they lost together approximately ever'ything that Petitioner brought in, but she has ncm been 
aw arde< Il i 11 K n t u i ith equitj alio \ e that \ i hich" \ as lost jointly 
115. The Court, also finds in fairness in equity, that Respondent supported the family 
I - .*-it of the liiiii years with \a\ Iillli: im HUH* liuiii I'dilinnu I llliiis, Ilk1 I mill s calculation, 
which is fair and equitable under the circumstances, is that neither the Petitioner or Respondent 
owes the other party any sums beyond that "w hich has been 01 dered above, 
I i(j# rriie Court finds the parties own several bank and other investment accounts. 
117. The Court finds Petitioner has personal and business accounts with Wells Fargo, a 
simple IRA, a SEP IRA, a 401(k) rollover, and a Creating ( \ nun mini v At I I (!«,) 
118. The Court finds Petitioner's combined balance in her banking and investment 
accoi ints is approximately $70 700 
119. The Court finds Respondent has accounts vvif-. \meritradc, a ^ clta el </ 'king 
accoi Jilt aiiK I O'Hnni invest iiinit : 
$12,600 for Wasatch Ice. 
1 "(I I hi < ' 'o t i i ! fiiicls lllii1 \\'".i ".ii I HI III Hi v u T i n u l I1. In In ,iv\ . t h i r d In Ki s p n w l n i l 
1J:;. The Court finds the 2004 income tax. refund is to be awarded to Petitioner, 
122. 1 :i Coi I i: I: finds e achpai t) shoi ildbe av. arded all i etii einent accounts and all 
other accounts in their own name and in their possession. 
123. In making this aw ard, the Court is awaie thai some ol Respondent's retirement 
accounts were accumulated during the marriage, and some are premarital. However, the Court 
finds that given Petitioner's income, and what the Court belie\ es to be her prospects for 
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continued substantial income, Respondent should be awarded his retirement account • . •*. : 
- ..t. ;SL tu Petitioner. 
J4, 5 iw ^ourt further finds that Petitioner should be awarded all of the accounts in 
* . ^
 UlSCUSSe(j ^ove. 
iQ
 ' * -s i ourt finds the parties should cooperate with one another to remove their 
respecii - » . * - . . < ' 
126. The Court: finds that Petitioner should, have returned to her, her prior name ;>i 
Rinehart. 
1 27, 1 1 K " ( "ourt finds each party is to retain any frequent fiver miles in their .tnJC^ 
although the Court was HOI cleai bum die CVKII'IH t liovi MII II MM ... • x 
party, especially I' ^*'»ndent, and the Court does not understand the Respondent's need for such 
miles other than to give them, to someone else, 
128. The Court finds each party is responsible for their own post-separation debt which 
they have incurred. 
j .
 UJUlt debts are later discovered, that have not been 
divided as specm«'uiiy MUIUMLU nenem, the person incurring the debt should be solely responsible 
d II | uyinent thereof, and tli : nil hereby orders the incurring party to hold the other party 
harmless therefrom. In addition, the party incurring the debt should inform, the creditor of his or 
tic/in M'spoMsihihl \ In p i") llii1 n mil ilrbl iii II I Is iv 11 (IK1 nedifix informal of the lutlv's current 
address for the purposes of notification, 
I Il In I'liiiliH's .sininlil hii ink it'll as follows: 
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a I he party obligated to pay a debt is 01 dei ed to send a cop) of the Decree 
of Divorce to each joint creditor informing them that he/she is required to 
pay that debt, 
b. The party obligated to pay a debt is ordered to notify each joint creditor of 
each party's separate address for purposes of notification. 
c Tin |Milv nhlif,jilul lo fMy .1 dri l l is o i i l n r i ! hi minim I lit* (oiiil i n ililim 
that each party is entitled to receive individual statements, notices and 
pan\ is ordered u. ,nlnr u the credit agency th;*t no UCLMIP C ueiU report or other 
debt, unless the creditor has I'v *\ made a I'emjMd ici payment eii the party who iS 
.•>t. 
131. Thtj Court funis ihaf tNirh oi'lluj parties i± fuIK capable **: navmg their own 
attorney fees and therefore hereby orders each party to pay their own costs and fees, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 ' I he Coiii t has jm isdiction over the matters as both parties are residents of Summit 
Count v. ^r:ite of I Jtah, and were .for three months immediately prior to filing of this action. 
I Petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce from,. Respondent on the grounds 
of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final upon entry. 
3 The terms of the Decree of Divorce should be consistent with the above outlined 
findings of fact. 
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DATED this 7 ' day of ' / / / ,2006. 
-
 T - L-L-f 
// ^- C* L 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVEJ3AS-IU i JRM AND CONTENT 
-2 7-/vf( 
CHR-IStlNA I. MILLER 
J ; i t >ie\ for Respondent 
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Hodge v. Hodge 
Appeal No. 20060789 
Proposed Asset Schedule Based on 50/50 Split of IVlarita! Assets 
Description of Property 
ASSETS 
Value 
Wasatch Ice Stock $12,600.00 
2004 Income Tax Refund $19,486.00 
2964 American Saddler 
$1,350,000 value - $567,000 mortgage $783,000.00 
Delta 401k Family Care Savings Plan 
(premarital portion) $89,277.00 
Delta account, remaining accounts 
inlcuding: 
401k Family Care Savings Plan 
(marital portion) - $165,396 
Delta Defined Contirbution Retirement 
Account-$17,158 
Delta Traditional IRA - $606 
Delta MPPP-$103,098 $286,258.00 
Ameritrade (8730) $315.00 
Ameritrade(1101) I $5,910.00 
RJ O'Brien Accounts IRA $52,000.00 
RJ O'Brien Accounts 
Schwab SEP IRA 
Schwab 401k 
Schwab Rollover IRA 
Schwab Trust Account 
$18,000.00 
$14,196.00 
$29,679.00 
$63,317.00 
$47,831.00 
Schwab Simple IRA $10,935.00 
Delta Credit Union Checking/Savings 
Zions Bank Savings 
Wells Fargo Creating Community 
Account (5638) 
Wells Fargo Personal Account (8033) 
Wells Fargo 1 
Delta Pension 
$18,400.00 
$1,028.00 
$68,647.00 
$19,233.00 
$41,248.60 
2003 Acura MDX - Mike ! 
2002 Acura MDX - Diane ! 
2001 Subaru Outback - Mike ! 
LIABILITIES 
December 2005 Payment to Suzie's 
Trust -$154,000.00 
TOTAL 
1/2 Marital Assets Value 
TOTAL AWARD 
1- While the balance in Ms. Hodge's personal account (8033), as c 
unreconciled balance. Exh. 37 and 48 (received at trial) evidence 1 
amounts from her business account (5638) into her personal accoi 
different dates, they cannot be reconciled and fail to evidence the c 
Hodge calims the marital estate was dissipated by Ms. Hodge iri th 
Diane's 
Separate and/or 
Premarital 
$63,317.00 
$47,831.00 
$111,148.00 
$574,998.80 
$686,146.80 
)f April 11, 2006 was $' 
hat on April 17 and 24, 
jnt, totaling $41,248.60 
ieposits in transit betwe 
e amount of $41,248.6( 
Mike's 
Separate and/or 
Premarital 
$89,277.00 
$5,910.00 
$52,000.00 
$18,000.00 
$1,028.00 
$166,215.00 
$574,998.80 
$741,213.80 
9,233, this represt 
2006, Ms. Hodge 
Because these s 
en these accounts 
X (R.409) 
] 
IVlarita! 
$12,600.00 
$19,486.00: 
$783,000.00 
$286,258.00
 { 
$315.00 
$14,196.00 
$29,679.00 
$10,935.00 
$18,400.00 
$68,647.00 
$19,233.00 
$41,248.60 
QDRO 
-$154,000.00 
$1,149,997.60 
snts an 
transferred two 
tatements are on 
. Accordingly, Mr 
